We consider the exchange market models with divisible goods where the demands of the agents satisfy the weak gross substitutes (WGS) property. This is a well-studied property, in particular, it gives a sufficient condition for the convergence of the classical tâtonnement dynamics. In this paper, we present a simple auction algorithm that obtains an approximate market equilibrium for WGS demands. Such auction algorithms have been previously known for restricted classes of WGS demands only. As an application of our result, we obtain an efficient algorithm to find an approximate spending-restricted market equilibrium for WGS demands, a model that has been recently introduced as a continuous relaxation of the Nash Social Welfare problem.
Introduction
Market equilibrium models play a central role in mathematical economics. In the exchange market model, a set of agents arrive at the market with initial endowments of divisible goods. A market equilibrium comprises a set of prices and allocations of goods to the agents such that each agent spends their income from selling their initial endowment on a bundle that maximizes their utility, and the market clears: the full amount of each good is allocated. This model was first studied by Walras in 1874 [50] , who also introduced a natural market dynamics, called the tâtonnement process. A continuous version of the process was shown to converge to an equilibrium if the utility functions satisfy the weak gross substitutability (WGS) property, namely, that if the prices of some goods increase and the others remain unchanged, the demand for the latter goods may not decrease (see Arrow, Block, and Hurwitz [3] , Arrow and Hurwitz [6] , and references therein). However, Scarf [48] showed that tâtonnement may not always converge to an equilibrium. We refer the reader to [43, Chapter 17] on the stability of the tâtonnement process.
The existence of a market equilibrium is always guaranteed under some weak assumptions, as shown by Arrow and Debreu [4] , using Kakutani's fixed point theorem. The computational aspects of finding a market equilibrium have been extensively studied in the theoretical computer science community over the last two decades, establishing hardness results as well as polynomialtime algorithms for certain cases. We refer the reader to [11, 13, 17, 24, 27, 33, 39, 49, 51] for an overview on the literature.
The polynomial-time computability of a market equilibrium for WGS utilities was established by Codenotti, Pemmaraju, and Varadarajan [18] . Further, Codenotti, McCune, and Varadarajan [16] have shown that a simple discrete variant of the tâtonnement algorithm converges to an approximate equilibrium (see also [46, Section 6.3] ). This was followed by a number of papers providing tâtonnement algorithms for various classes of utility functions, some of them substantially weakening the need of central coordination among agents, see e.g., [7, 14, 15, 20, 30] .
Auction algorithms In this paper, we focus on an even simpler subclass of tâtonnement-type algorithms, called auction algorithms. Whereas prices in tâtonnement may increase as well as decrease, in auctions prices may only go up. For exchange market models, the first such algorithms have been established for linear utilities by Garg and Kapoor [34] (see also [46, Section 5.12] ). The algorithm was later improved [35] and generalized to separable concave gross substitute utility functions [37] , to a subclass of non-separable gross-substitutes called uniformly separable [36] , and to a production model with linear production constraints and linear utilities [40] .
There is a long history of auction algorithms both in the optimization and in the economics literature. Bertsekas [9, 10] has introduced auction algorithms for assignment and transportation problems. Closely related algorithms were introduced for markets with indivisible goods, by Kelso and Crawford [41] , and Demange, Gale, and Sotomayor [23] . We will discuss markets with indivisible goods later in this section. In both contexts, the appeal of auction algorithms is their simplicity and distributed nature: under simple "ground rules" the agents outbid each other and in the process converge to an approximate market-equilibrium. These algorithms do not require a central authority and need only minimal coordination between the agents. Further, these algorithmic frameworks are quite robust and easily allow for various extensions and generalizations.
Our contributions Our first main contribution is an auction algorithm that computes an approximate market equilibrium for arbitrary WGS utilities, given via demand oracles, settling an open question from [36] . This result shows that for WGS utilities, this restricted class of tâtonnement algorithms already suffices to obtain a market equilibrium. The result affirms the natural intuition that the WGS property is geared for auction algorithms. A main invariant in auction algorithms is that at every price increase, the agents will still hold on to the goods they have purchased previously at the lower prices. This property is almost identical to the definition of the WGS property; nevertheless, making an auction algorithm work for general WGS utilities requires some careful technical ideas.
The previously mentioned auction algorithms operate with two prices for each good, a lower price p j and a higher price (1 + ǫ)p j . For linear utilities, [34] maintains that all purchases are maximum bang-per-buck goods with respect to the lower or higher price. This idea can be extended to separable [35] and to uniformly separable utilities [37] , but does not work if the utilities are genuinely non-separable. For this general case, our main technical idea is to maintain subsets of optimal bundles for each agent with respect to some individual prices. These individual prices can be different for the agents but fall between the higher and lower prices p and (1 + ǫ)p.
We also study auction algorithms for multiple models of Fisher markets. These are a special case of exchange markets where every buyer arrives with a fixed budget instead of an endowment of goods. A particular motivation comes from recent study of the Nash Social Welfare problem: allocating indivisible goods to agents so that the geometric mean of their utilities is maximized. This problem is NP-hard already for simple classes of utilities, and there has been a considerable recent literature on approximation algorithms for the problem and its extensions. Cole and Gkatzelis [21] gave the first constant-factor approximation for linear utilities, followed by further work with stronger guarantees as well as extensions for other utility classes [1, 2, 8, 12, 19, 21, 31, 32] .
The algorithm in [21] and many others start by studying a continuous relaxation corresponding to a specific market equilibrium problem with spending restrictions: namely, if the price p i of good i is above 1, then the amount sold of a good i is decreased to 1/p i from the initial total amount of 1. Whereas a market equilibrium with spending restrictions can be obtained via a convex program for linear utilities [19] , it becomes challenging to find for more general utilities: currently known cases are budget additive valuations [31] and separable, piecewise-linear concave (SPLC) utility functions [2] .
In this paper, we show that auction algorithms are particularly well-suited for spending restricted market equilibrium computation: once the price of a good goes above one, we can naturally decrease the total available amount of these goods within the auction framework. This enables us to find simple approximation algorithms for spending restricted equilibria for a broad class of utility functions, including the models above as well as their common generalization: budget additive SPLC. A surprising feature here is that we do not even have to make the standard non-satiation assumption. We expect that our algorithm for finding approximate spending restricted equilibria will find new applications for the Nash Social Welfare problem.
Markets with indivisible goods Auction algorithms have been widely studied in the context of markets with indivisible goods. Equilibrium may not always exists in markets with indivisible goods. The class of (discrete) gross substitute utilities was introduced by Kelso and Crawford [41] . For this class, an equilibrium is guaranteed to exists, and approximate equilibrium can be efficiently found via a simple auction algorithm, extending [22] . It turned out that the discrete gross substitutes property is essentially a necessary and sufficient condition for the auction algorithm to work. We refer the reader to the survey by Leme [42] on the role of gross substitute utilities in markets with indivisible goods, and their connections to discrete convex analysis.
Whereas the definitions of discrete gross substitutes and continuous WGS utilities is very similar, there does not appear to be a direct connection between these notions. The main difference is in the utility concepts: for indivisible markets, the standard model is to maximize the valuation minus the price of the set at given prices, whereas the standard divisible market models operate with fiat money: the prices appear via the budget constraints but not in the utility value. Still, our result can be interpreted as the continuous analogue of the strong link between auction algorithms and the gross substitutes property for markets with indivisible goods: we show that auction algorithms are applicable for the entire class of WGS utilities for markets with divisible goods. We suspect that the converse should also be true, namely, that the applicability of auction algorithms should be limited to WGS utilities. In contrast, tâtonnement algorithms have been successfully applied beyond the WGS class, see e.g. [14, 15, 30] .
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the models and concepts used in the paper. Section 3 presents the auction algorithm for exchange markets. Section 4 gives a modification of the algorithm for Fisher markets with spending restrictions. Section 5 implements the key subroutine of the algorithm for Gale demand systems, a natural class with particular relevance to the Nash social welfare problem. Finally, Section 6 considers budget-additive SPLC utility functions.
Models and concepts

The exchange market model
Let us use the notation [k] = {1, 2, . . . , k}, and let 1 k denote the k dimensional vector with all entries 1. We will simply use 1 if the dimension is clear from the context. We consider a market with a set of agents A = [n] and divisible goods G = [m]. Each agent i ∈ [n] arrives at the market with an initial endowment of goods e (i) ∈ R m + . Thus, the total amount of each good j ∈ [m] is e j where e = n i=1 e (i) ; w.l.o.g. e j > 0. Given a non-negative price vector p ∈ R m + , the budget of agent i at prices p is defined as
We now define the market equilibrium using demand systems. A bundle x is non-negative vector
that denotes the set of preferred bundles of an agent at prices p and budget b. Bundles in D(p, b) are called the optimal or demand bundles at prices p and budget b. This corresponds to the standard concept of a demand function, except that we do not assume the uniqueness of a preferred bundle. For example, in case of a linear utility function u(x) = j∈G v j x j , D(p, b) includes all fractional assignment of goods maximizing v j /p j with a total price b. If |D(p, b)| = 1 for all (p, b) ∈ R m+1 we say that demand system is simple, and we will also use D(p, b) to denote this single bundle.
We include the budget b in the definition of the demand system, even though for exchange markets the budget of agent i uniquely defined by the prices as p ⊤ e (i) . This formalism will be useful for our algorithm where the budgets will be defined according to a slightly different set of prices.
Definition 2.1 (Market equilibrium). Let D i denote the demand system of agent i ∈ A. We say that the prices p ∈ R m + and bundles
), and
j ≤ e j , with equality whenever p j > 0, for all j ∈ G.
That is, p and the optimal bundles x (i) form an equilibrium if no good is overdemanded and all goods at a positive price are fully sold. Note that this implies that every agent fully spends their budget.
we say that the demand system D satisfies the weak gross substitutes (WGS) property.
We will also say that D(p, b) is a WGS demand system. In the context of the tâtonnement process, the weak gross substitutes property is usually defined with respect to the aggregate excess demand function of all agents. We use the stronger requirement of having a WGS demand system for each agent. The previous auction algorithms [36, 37] have also used WGS on the level of agents as this seems to be the necessary condition that allows agents to update their bundles individually, as opposed to tâtonnement, where the prices adjustments react to the aggregate demands. We note that WGS demands for individual agents are also assumed in the context of indivisible goods.
Definition 2.3 (Demand oracle). For a WGS demand system
, and a vector x ∈ D(p, b). The output is a vector y ∈ D(p ′ , b ′ ) such that that y j ≥ x j whenever p ′ j = p j . In other words, the oracle provides the allocations guaranteed by the definitions of WGS systems. The complex form of the definition is due to the possible non-uniqueness of demand bundles. For simple demand systems, the input to the oracle is simply a vector (p ′ , b ′ ) ∈ R m+1 + , and the output is the unique vector y ∈ D(p ′ , b ′ ).
For exchange markets, we will make the following assumptions:
Assumption 1 (Scale invariance). We assume that for every agent i it holds that
That is, we require that the demand is homogeneous of degree 0; informally, the demand does not depend on the currency. This is a standard assumption in microeconomics and exchange markets, see e.g. [5, 26, 28, 44] . That is, in every optimal bundle the agents must fully spend their budgets. This is a standard assumption for exchange markets as it is necessary for the fundamental theorems of welfare economics (see e.g. [43, Chapter 16] ). However, we note that we will not require this assumption in Section 4 for spending restricted Fisher markets.
Approximate equilibria Let us now define the concept of an ǫ-equilibrium in exchange markets that we will find in our algorithm. Definition 2.4 (Approximate equilibrium). For an ǫ > 0, the prices p ∈ R m and bundles
j ≤ e j , and
That is, every agent owns a subset of their optimal bundle at prices that are within a factor (1 + ǫ) from p, and all goods are nearly sold: the value of the unsold goods is at most ǫ fraction of the total value of the goods. The total value of the goods "taken away" from the near-optimal bundles of the buyers is
. Parts (i) and (iii) imply that this amount is ≤ 2ǫp ⊤ e. The definition (i) can be seen as a natural extension of the corresponding approximate optimality conditions in [34, 36, 37] . For linear utilities, [34] requires that approximate maximum bang-perbuck condition v ij /p j ≤ (1 + ǫ)v ik p k for any agent i, goods j and k such that x ik > 0. Thus, one can set approximate prices p ≤ p (i) ≤ (1 + ǫ)p for each agent for which they purchase maximum bang-per-buck goods.
The condition (iii) corresponds to the definition of approximate equilibrium in [25] and [38] . This notion is weaker than the ones used in [34, 36, 37] . The most important difference is that the latter papers guarantee that each agent recovers approximately their optimal utility. Such a property could be achieved by strengthening the bound in (iii) from ǫp ⊤ e to ǫp min e min , where p min is the minimum price and e min is the smallest total fractional amount in the initial endowment of any agent. However, this would come at the expense of substantially worse running time guarantees in our algorithmic framework.
Examples of WGS demand systems
A standard way to implement a demand oracle is via an explicitly given utility function. Assume the agent is equipped with a concave utility function u : R m + → R + . The set of demand bundles at prices p and budget b it given as the set of optimal solutions of max u(x)
We say that a utility function is WGS if the corresponding demand system is WGS. Most models studied in the literature assume strictly concave utilities and thus have a unique optimal solution; a notable exception is the case of linear utility functions. If the solution is not unique, we can implement the demand oracle for inputs (p, b), (p ′ , b ′ ) and x ∈ D(p, b) by imposing the constraints that u(y) equals the optimal utility in D(p ′ , b ′ ), and y i ≥ x i for every i with p ′ i = p i . Thus, the optimal demand system can also be implemented via convex programming (we now ignore the questions of numerical precision). We note that for linear utilities, implementing the demand oracle is straightforward.
We now present some classical examples of WGS utilities previously studied in the literature.
• For v ∈ R m + the linear utility is given by u(
• The constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility is defined by u(
. It is well-known that CES demand system satisfies the WGS property if and only if σ > 1.
• The Cobb-Douglas utility function is given by u(x) = j x α j j where j α j = 1, α ≥ 0. The unique optimal bundle is therefore x j = bα j p j and D u (p, b) = {x}. The Cobb-Douglas utility function satisfies the WGS property for any parameter choices.
Conic combinations of demand systems Given two WGS utility functions u and u ′ , the demand system corresponding to their sum u + u ′ may not be WGS. On the other hand, consider two simple WGS demand systems D and D ′ and nonnegative coefficients λ, λ ′ . Then it is easy to see that λD + λ ′ D ′ is also a simple WGS demand system. This enables the construction of some interesting demand systems. For example, [44] has studied hybrids of CES and Cobb-Douglas demands, where the demand system can be given as
Note that if D = D u and D ′ = D u ′ for some concave utility functions u and u ′ , the demand system λD + λ ′ D ′ will in general not correspond to the utility function λu + λ ′ u ′ . In fact, it seems unclear if one can explicitly write the utility functions corresponding to such convex combinations. Our model does not require the demand system to be given in the form D = D u for some concave utility function u.
Price elasticity of demands One possible implementation of the key subroutine FindNewPrices (Section 3) relies on the price elasticity of the demands. The standard definition of the elasticity for good j with respect to the price of good k is e j,k = ∂ log x j (p, b)/∂ log p k , where x j (p, b) is the (unique) demand for good j at prices p and budget b. The WGS property guarantees that e j,k ≥ 0 if j = k, and consequently, e k,k ≤ 0. The definition below corresponds to e k,k ≥ −f for all k ∈ [m], for the more general model of non-simple demand systems. 
The following bounds are easy to verify from the definitions. The proof is given in Appendix A.
Lemma 2.6. The CES demand system with parameter σ > 1 has elasticity at least −σ, and the Cobb-Douglas demand system has elasticity at least −1.
No finite lower bound can be given on the elasticity of linear demand systems. If we are buying a positive amount of good j, that means that j maximizes v k /p k . If there is another good ℓ with v j /p j = v ℓ /p ℓ , then if we increase p j but leave the other prices unchanged, then x ′ j = 0 for every optimal bundle x ′ with respect to the new prices.
Separable and uniformly separable WGS utility functions The auction algorithm in [34] was later extended in [37] to separable WGS utility functions, that is, if u = j∈G u j where each u j is a WGS utility function depending only on good j. This model was further generalized in [36] for uniformly separable WGS utility functions, that is, if
, where each f j is a strictly decreasing function. This class already includes CES and Cobb-Douglas utilities; however, it does not appear to extend to demand systems obtained as their conic combinations, where even the explicit form of the utility function is unclear. Further, the running time bound stated in [36] is unbounded for the CES and Cobb-Douglas cases; see Appendix B.1 for further discussion of these results.
Fisher markets and the Nash Social Welfare problem
Fisher markets are a well-studied special case of exchange markets, where the initial endowment of agent i is δ i e for δ i > 0 and therefore the relative budgets of the agents is independent of the prices. With appropriate normalization of the prices, we can assume that agent i arrives with a fixed budget b i and that there is exactly a unit of each good. At an equilibrium, the agents spend these budgets on their most preferred goods at the given prices. Let us now assume that the demand systems are given via utility functions as in (1). Eisenberg and Gale [29] gave a convex programming formulation of the market equilibrium problem for linear utilities. Eisenberg [28] showed that the optimal solutions to the following convex program are in one-to-one correspondence with the market equilibria assuming that the utility functions are homogenous of degree one, that is, u i (αx) = αu i (x) for any α > 0.
We note that the equilibrium prices are given by the optimal Lagrange multipliers.
The Nash Social Welfare problem In the Nash Social Welfare (NSW) problem, we need to allocate m indivisible items to n agents (m ≥ n), with agent i equipped with a utility function on the subsets of goods. The goal is to find a partition
of the goods in order to maximize the geometric mean of the utilities, (
The first constant factor approximation for this problem was given by Cole and Gkatzelis [21] . Their approach was to first solve a continuous relaxation that corresponds to a divisible market problem, and round the fractional optimal solution. The natural relaxation is exactly the program (2) above with all b i = 1. For linear utilities, we can use the natural continuous extension u i (x) = j∈S v ij x ij of the additive utility function. However, it is easy to see that this relaxation has an unbounded integrality gap. Cole and Gkatzelis [21] introduced the notion of spending restricted equilibrium that we now define in a slightly more general form.
Definition 2.7. Let us be given n agents with demand systems D i (p, b) and fixed budgets b ∈ R n + . Further, let us be given bounds t ∈ (0, ∞) m . The prices p ∈ R m and allocations
Note that the set of equilibria can be non-convex already for budget additive utilities as shown in [31] ; see Section 6 for the definition of this class of utilities.
At given prices p, we let a j (p) = a j = min{1, t j /p j } denote the available amount of good j. That is, the amount of money spent on good j is bounded by t j . By setting t j = ∞ for all j, the above reduces to the standard definition of Fisher market equilibrium.
The algorithm in [21] first computes a spending restricted equilibrium for linear Fisher markets with bounds t j = 1, and show that this can be rounded to an integer solution of cost at most 2e 1/e times the optimal NSW solution. Note that the spending restrictions cannot be directly added to the formulation (2) since they involve the Lagrange multipliers p. An SR-equilibrium in [21] was found via an extension of the algorithms by Devanur et al. [24] and Orlin [47] for linear Fisher markets.
Subsequent work by Cole et al. [19] showed that a spending restricted equilibrium for linear markets can be obtained as an optimal solution of a convex program (extending a convex formulation of linear Fisher market equilibrium that is different from (2)), and has also improved the approximation guarantee to 2 (the current best factor is 1.45 [8] ). However, this convex formulation is only known to work for linear utility functions.
Further work has studied the NSW problem for more general utility functions, following the same strategy of first solving a spending-restricted market equilibrium problem then rounding. Anari et al. [2] studied NSW with separable, piecewise-linear concave (SPLC) utilities. The paper [31] studies budget-additive valuations, that correspond to the utility function u i (x) = min(c i , j u ij x j ). Both papers find (exact or approximate) solutions to the corresponding spending-restricted market equilibrium problem via fairly complex combinatorial algorithms.
The Gale demand systems The demand systems of the market models in [2, 31] do not exactly correspond to (1) . In [31] one needs additional conditions on the buyers being "thrifty"; in [2] a "utility market model" is used. In both cases, the total spending of the agents can be below their budgets. A natural unified way of capturing these equilibrium concepts is via Gale demand systems, defined as
We call b log u(x) − p ⊤ x the Gale objective function. It is easy to verify using Lagrangian duality that if all u i 's are concave functions, and the utility functions correspond to the Gale demand systems
, then the program (2) always finds a market equilibrium. Moreover, if the utilities are homogenous of degree one, then this equilibrium coincides with the equilibrium for the "standard" demand systems given by (1) . For general concave utility functions, the optimal bundles stay within the budget b (that is, p ⊤ x ≤ b), but may not exhaust it. Finding a spendingrestricted equilibrium for Gale demand systems appears to be the right setting for NSW; in fact, the concepts used by [2] and [31] correspond to the Gale equilibrium in these settings, and moreover, these Gale demand systems admit the WGS property, see Section 6. On contrary, the demand systems arising from the previously mentioned utility functions, do not satisfy the WGS property in usual setting (1) . We refer the reader to the paper by Nesterov and Shikhman [45] on Gale demand systems as well as the more general concept of Fisher-Gale equilibrium; they also give a tâtonnement type algorithm for finding such an equilibrium.
Approximate spending-restricted equilibrium We use an extension of Definition 2.4 as our approximate SR-equilibrium notion. The main difference is that we require all goods to be fully spent.
For an ǫ > 0, the prices p ∈ R m and bundles
We note that whereas a market equilibrium will always exist for WGS utilities, the existence of an SR-equilibrium is a nontrivial question. For example, suppose an agent i has budget b i and Cobb-Douglas utility function
for some k with t k = 1. Then the agent i would like to spend at least β k b i > 1 on good j for any prices p, but the total money that can be spent on this good is capped at 1.
While we do not have general necessary and sufficient conditions on the existence of an SRequilibrium, we show that the objectives previously studied in the context of NSW admit an equilibrium. In the case of budget additive utilities, we have all t j = 1, and all b i = 1. An ǫ/napproximate SR-equilibrium satisfies the required accuracy in [31] . Whereas [2] computes an exact SR-equilibrium, an approximate SR-equilibrium should be sufficient to obtain a (slightly worse) approximation guarantee.
In Section 6, we show that our algorithmic framework is applicable to compute an ǫ-equilibrium for budget-additive SPLC, the common generalization of the models in [2] and [31] . A similar rounding as in [31] could be applied to approximate NSW for this class. However, a better approximation ratio for this case has already been obtained in [12] , using a different approach.
3 Auction algorithm for exchange markets
The algorithm
The algorithm (shown in Algorithm 1) uses the accuracy parameter 0 < ǫ < 0.25, and returns a 4ǫ-approximate equilibrium. We initialize all prices p j = 1 and the prices will only increase during the algorithm, in increments by a factor (1 + ǫ). This initialization is enabled by Assumption 1 that guarantees the existence of market clearing prices where all positive prices are ≥ 1. 1 We maintain a price vector p called the market prices; the budget of agent
At any point of the algorithm, agent i owns a bundle c (i) of goods such that
Some amount of good j is sold at the lower price p j , and some at the higher price (1 + ǫ)p j . The price the agent i has to pay for good j is the higher price (1 + ε)p j if p (i) j = (1 + ǫ)p j and the lower price p j otherwise. (Note that this is in contrast with [34] and the other previous auction algorithms where i may pay p j for some amount of good j and (1 + ǫ)p j for another amount.)
We consider the agents one-by-one. If an agent i has surplus money, they use the subroutine FindNewPrices to update their prices p (i) and bundle x (i) , by maintaining x
j -this latter requirement turns out to be the main challenge. They will then try to purchase x
j amount of good j in the Outbid procedure. They start by purchasing any unsold amount of good at price p j . If they still need more, then they will outbid other agents who have been paying the lower price p j for this good, by offering the higher price (1 + ǫ)p j . Once good j is sold only at the increased price (1 + ǫ)p j , we increase the price of the good. If no price is increased we move to the next agent, otherwise we announce the new prices p and repeat. The algorithm terminates once the total surplus of the agents drops below 3ǫp ⊤ e. At this point, we can conclude that the current prices and allocations form a 4ǫ-approximate equilibrium.
We express the running time of the algorithm in terms of the running time T F of the subroutine FindNewPrices, as well as the upper bound p max on the prices at any ǫ-equilibrium. Such an upper bound may be obtained for the specific demand systems. 2 Alternatively, one can follow the approach of the papers [18, 16] by adding a dummy agent with a Cobb-Douglas demand system, and an initial endowment of a small fraction of all goods. In the presence of such an agent, we can obtain a strong bound on p max , at the expense of obtaining a slightly worse approximation guarantee. We describe the construction in Appendix B.2. Algorithm 1 finds a 4ǫ-approximate market equilibrium in time O nm log p max ǫ
There are various possibilities to implement FindNewPrices. In Section 3.3 we present a simple price increment procedure in the case of bounded elasticities; recall the elasticity bound f from Definition 2.5. Using this subroutine, we obtain the following overall running time bound. Theorem 3.2. If all agents have elasticity at least −f for some f > 0, then an ǫ-approximate equilibrium can be computed in time O nm log p max ǫ 2 (mf · T D + n) , where T D is the time needed for one call to the demand oracle.
As noted earlier, there are simple demand systems such as linear demand systems where the flexibility parameter cannot be bounded. However, in case the demand system is given in the form (1) via a utility function that is homogeneous of degree one, then we can obtain an implementation of FindNewPrices by solving a convex program. This is described in Section 5. This is in particular applicable for CES utilities with σ > 1 and Cobb-Douglas utilities. One could find further possible ways for implementing FindNewPrices for particular demand systems; for example, we give a simple direct procedure for linear utilities in Lemma 3.7, and a procedure for budget-additive SPLC utilities in Section 6.
We give an overview of the running times of the previous auction algorithms in Appendix B.1.
Invariants Let us now summarize the invariant properties maintained throughout the algorithm. We say that a bundle y dominates the bundle x if x ≤ y.
(a) Each good is partitioned into three parts according to the price it is being sold at:
• amount w j is the unsold part of the good,
• amount l j is sold at the lower price p j , and
• amount h j is sold at the higher price (1 + ǫ)p j .
Moreover, w j + l j > 0, i.e., there is always a part of the good that is unsold or owned by an agent at the lower price.
(b) The unsold amount w j of each good is non-increasing.
(c) The budget of agent i is b i = p ⊤ e (i) . Each agent i maintains prices p (i) such that p ≤ p (i) ≤ (1 + ǫ)p, and owns a bundle c (i) that is dominated by a bundle
In accordance with (d), the surplus of agent i is defined as
The Outbid subroutine An important subroutine, described in Procedure Outbid, controls how the ownership of goods may change. If agent k has paid price p j on a certain amount of good j, then agent i may take over some of this amount by offering a higher price (1 + ǫ)p j . We may also have i = k, in which case the agent outbids themselves. We also incorporate into the procedure the case when a certain amount of a good is being purchased for the first time. Output: A 4ǫ-approximate market equilibrium.
j , and l j = 0; NewIt for i ∈ [n] do // recompute the budgets and surpluses
14 end // Skip the goods with p (i)
Procedure Outbid(i, j, t) // t is the amount of good j agent i wants to outbid.
10 end
Main iterations The algorithm is partitioned into iterations. Each iteration finishes when the price of a good increases from p j to (1 + ǫ)p j . At every such event, the budgets b i of the agents also increase. Therefore, at the start of an iteration each agent i recomputes their budget at line NewIt. An iteration is further partitioned into steps, that are single executions of the main for loop in Algorithm 1. The algorithm terminates as soon as the total surplus drops below 3ǫp ⊤ e.
Steps Suppose we are considering agent i. By invariant (c), the agent is buying a bundle
In other words, the condition (A) says that agent i still wants whatever they own even at the increased pricesp. The condition (B) is the crucial one for the outbid. It guarantees thatp ≥ p (i) , and whenever an agent wants to buy more of some good than they already own at least by a factor 1 + ǫ, then they are willing to pay the higher price (1 + ǫ)p j for it. (They might already be paying the increased price to start with if p
.) The description of this subroutine is postponed to Section 3.3.
The above properties suggest the following update rules for each good j ∈ [m].
The good j was in L i and needs to be moved to H i , i.e., agent used to pay p j but now is willing to pay the higher price for the good. Agent i first outbids themselves for the amount c We have covered all cases above since p (i) j ≤p j . Note that in the first two cases the agent will own min(y j , l j + w j ) amount of good j, whereas they will own c (i) j amount in the third case. Once all of the goods are considered we set p (i) =p, x (i) = y, and update c (i) as the current allocation. If w j + l j = 0 for some j then h j = e j , i.e., the whole good j is sold at the higher price p j (1 + ǫ). For each such good j we increase the market price p j to (1 + ǫ)p j , and for all agents k we set p (k) j = p j for the new increased p j . Moreover, we set l j = e j and h j = 0. The step ends.
Analysis
For the correctness of the algorithm, we need to show that all invariants are maintained. Proof. (a) We always sell the goods at either price p j or at the price (1 + ǫ)p j . Moreover, at the end of the step if we have a good with w j + l j = 0, we increase its price and set l j = e j and hence, w j + l j > 0 holds again.
(b) Once a part of some good is sold to some agent, it remains being sold to the agents until the end of the algorithm. This is guaranteed by property (A) of the procedure FindNewPrices, and the fact that c (c) Suppose these properties hold for every agent before a step of agent i. The requirements (A) and (B) guarantee that these properties are maintained for agent i after the step. Now, consider an agent k different from i. In the step, agent k could only lose a part a good through the outbid and hence c (k) does not increase. As long as the prices p (k) do not change, (c) trivially holds. The only time p (k) can change is the price increase step, namely, if p j increases to (1 + ǫ)p j , it forces p (k) j = (1 + ǫ)p j . Note that the price increase only happens once l j = 0. Assume we had p (k) j < (1 + ǫ)p j before the price increase, that is, agent k was buying good j at the lower price p j . By l j = 0 and invariant (d), it follows that c (k) j = 0 at this point. The WGS property implies that after increasing p (k) j , the bundle c (k) will be still dominated by an optimal bundle.
To complete the proof of (c), it remains to show that it is maintained at the beginning of the iteration, when the budgets are recomputed. Since the budgets may only increase, this again follows by the WGS property.
Next, we give a bound on the total number of iterations, using the same basic idea of organizing the steps into rounds as in [34] . A round consists of going over all agents exactly once in the main for loop and doing a step for each of them; that is, a round comprises at most n steps. Proof. Let us fix an iteration and denote with p the market prices at the start of the iteration. Consider a step of an agent i within the iteration. If from a good j, agent i buys everything that is available at the cheaper price p j , then the market price of good j increases and the iteration finishes. So for the rest of the proof we assume that the market price increase does not happen; consequently, the budget of each agent is unchanged.
Let ϕ denote the total amount of money spent at a certain point of this iteration that is spent by the agents on higher price goods. That is,
Claim 3.5. Let s i denote the surplus of agent i at the beginning of their step. Then the value of ϕ increases at least by s i − 2.25ǫb i in the step of agent i.
Proof. Recall cases 1-3 in the description of the step. Let T k be the set of goods that fall into case k, that is,
• If j ∈ T 1 , then (1 + ǫ)p j y j amount will be added to ϕ in the Outbid subroutine: in this case, the agent also outbids themselves, moving the good from L i to H i .
• If j ∈ T 2 , then (1 + ǫ)p j (y j − c (i) j ) amount will be added ϕ in the Outbid subroutine.
• If j ∈ T 3 , then we do not increase ϕ. Nevertheless, (B) guarantees thatp j (y j − c
Also note thatp j = (1+ǫ)p j if j ∈ T 1 ∪T 2 . Assumption 2 on non-satiation guarantees thatp ⊤ y = b i . Let ∆ϕ denote the increment in ϕ; this can be lower bounded as
using (4). The money spent by the agent at the beginning of the step is b i − s i . Good j is purchased at price at least p j according to (d),
With the above inequality, we obtain
using that ǫ < 0.25. This completes the proof.
As long as n i=1 s i > 3ǫp ⊤ e, the claim guarantees that ϕ increases in every round at least by 3ǫp ⊤ e − 2.25ǫ
Since ϕ ≤ p ⊤ e, it follows that the number of rounds is bounded by 2/ǫ.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Each agent is considered once in every round. In their step, the agents use their surpluses to outbid the goods. When the Outbid procedure is called either some c (k) j 's become zero or s (i) decreases to approximately zero. In every iteration there are at most nm events of the first type in total -each agent loses a good through the outbid at most once. In every round there are at most n events of the second type. It follows that the time taken by Outbid in an iteration is bounded by nm + 2n 2 /ǫ = O(nm + n 2 /ǫ).
Every step calls the procedure FindNewPrices exactly once. Hence, the time taken by FindNewPrices in an iteration is O(nT F /ǫ). If all prices are upper bounded by p max , then the number of iterations is bounded by m log 1+ǫ p max = O( m ǫ log p max ). The claimed running time bound follows. It is left to show that the prices p and bundles c (i) form a 4ǫ-approximate market equilibrium. The first two properties in the definition are clear: c (i) is dominated by an optimal bundle with respect to the prices p (i) , and no good is oversold. At termination, the total surplus of the buyers is bounded by 3ǫp ⊤ e. However, this surplus is computed assuming that some goods are sold at price p j and others at price (1 + ǫ)p j . Decreasing the price of the latter goods to p j releases an additional excess of at most ǫp ⊤ e. Consequently,
Implementing FindNewPrices for bounded elasiticities
We now describe the subroutine FindNewPrices(i, p (i) , p, ǫ, c (i) ). Recall that the outputs are new pricesp ≥ p (i) and a bundle y such that
Let us assume that the demand system D i has elasticity at least −f for some f > 0. Our Algorithm 2 for this case is a simple price increment procedure. First, we obtain y ∈ D i (p (i) , b i ) from the demand oracle such that y ≥ c (i) . This is possible due to invariant (c), that guarantees that
Then, the demand oracle is able to return a bundle y such that y ≥ x (i) ≥ c (i) . Then, we iterate the following step. As long as (B) is violated for a good j, we increase its price by a factor (1 + ǫ) 1/f until it reaches the upper bound (1 + ǫ)p j .
Algorithm 2: Finding new prices
Input: i, p (i) , p, ǫ, c (i) , f . Output: Pricesp and bundle y. We will assume that T D ≥ m, since the demand oracle needs to output an m-dimensional vector.
Proof. The bound on the number of iterations is clear: since we have p ≤p ≤ (1 + ǫ)p throughout, the price of every good can increase at most f times. Condition (A) is satisfied due to the WGS property and the bound on the demand elasticity. When increasingp j , the demand y k for k = j is non-decreasing as guaranteed by the demand oracle. Further, y j may decrease only by a factor (1 + ǫ), and since we had y j > (1 + ǫ)c As explained in Section 3, this is only one of the possible ways of implementing FindNewPrices. Section 5 presents a convex programming approach for utilities that are homogeneous of degree 1. For example, for CES with parameter σ > 1, the running time of Algorithm 2 depends linearly on σ (Lemma 2.6), whereas the running time in Section 5 is independent on this parameter. Nevertheless, for small values of σ the simple price increment procedure may be preferable to solving a convex program.
Further, more direct approaches for implementing FindNewPrices may be possible for particular demand systems. For Cobb-Douglas demands with parameter vector α (i) , it is easy to devise an O(m) time algorithm implementing the procedure. The algorithm relies on the fact that the optimal bundle is the bundle that allocates α Proof. Recall that for linear utilities y ∈ D i (p, b) as long as y j > 0 if and only if j ∈ arg max k v k /p k , called maximum bang-per-buck goods (MBB). We initializep = p (i) , and let S ⊆ [m] denote the set of MBB goods. We start increasing the prices of all goods j ∈ S at the same rate α. Once a good outside S becomes MBB, we include it in the set S and also start raising its price. We terminate once the budget is exhausted or once the pricep k for a good k ∈ S reaches the upper bound (1+ǫ)p k . In the latter case, we return the bundle y j = c
k . These prices and allocations clearly satisfy (A) and (B); in fact, we obtain (B) in the stronger form thatp j = (1 + ǫ)p j whenever y j > c (i) j . We need to extend S at most m times, and thus we can implement the procedure in O(m) time.
4 Auction algorithm for spending restricted equilibrium
The algorithm
We present a modification of Algorithm 1 for finding an approximate SR-equilibrium in a Fisher market where each agent satisfies the WGS property. The changes are fourfold. First, the budget b i is constant throughout the algorithm and it is a part of the input. As such, it does not depend on the prices of goods in the market. Second, we need to account for the fact that in an SR-equilibrium exactly min{1, t j /p j } of a good is sold. Third, the initialization must be changed since the prices cannot be scaled up as for exchange markets: we cannot assume that there exists an SR-equilibrium with p j ≥ 1 for all j. Fourth, we do not make Assumption 2 on non-satiation. We only use the following weaker assumption, namely that after the prices increase, the spending of every agent is non-decreasing. For the case of budget-additive utilities, Assumption 2 does not hold, whereas this weaker assumption is true.
We use the exact same variables as before and we change the invariants (a) and (b) slightly. The invariants (c) and (d) remain the same.
(a) The available amount a j of each good is partitioned into two parts according to the price it is being sold at:
• amount l j is sold at the lower price p j , and • amount h j is sold at the higher price (1 + ǫ)p j .
Moreover, l j > 0, i.e., there is always a part of the good owned by an agent at the lower price. It holds l j + h j = a j .
(b) The amount of each good j being sold is exactly a j = min{1, t j /p j }.
Recall the definition of the surplus
In the modified algorithm, we will use the relative surplus s r i instead, defined as
This is the difference between the money the agent would like to spend and what they are actually spending (in accordance with (c) and (d)). Under Assumption 2, s r i = s i holds; we need to make the distinction since we do not assume non-satiation.
Initialization In the case of exchange markets, we used Assumption 1 to state that approximate equilibrium prices ≥ 1 exist, and then we were able to initialize the algorithm by setting all prices to 1. This is not viable for Fisher markets, where even the total budget might be smaller than m. Instead, we assume that we are given some initial, small enough pricesp < t and optimal bundles
A simple way to achieve this is to have a single agent that overdemands all the goods, i.e., there is i ∈ [n] andp < t such that
Such implementations would need to be given for the particular demands.
Given such prices and allocations, we initialize p (i) =p for all i, and set all c (i) 's such that c (i) ≤ x (i) and i c (i) = 1. One can readily check that all invariants are satisfied after the initialization. In particular, l j = 1, h j = 0 for all j ∈ [m].
Changes to the algorithm In procedure Outbid, the first part is redundant as w j = 0 for all j. In the main part of the algorithm, one needs to make the following changes besides the initialization.
• Every occurrence of s i is replaced by s r i .
• We do not need to recompute the budgets and surpluses at line NewIt.
• We need to add a new line between lines 18-19. The new line decreases the amount of good sold to exactly min{1, t j /p j } by decreasing c (i) j for some agents i. This will decrease the amount of goods sold whenever p j > t j . Remark 4.1. A simple alternative initialization is to set the price of good j as p j = min{ǫ i b i /m, t j }, and start with allocations c (i) = 0. The drawback is that we would obtain a slightly weaker equilibrium at termination. Part (ii) of Definition 2.8 requires that all goods are fully sold; we would need to weaken this property to saying that the total price of all unsold goods would be ≤ ǫ i b i . Below, we describe the analysis for the case where initially all goods are fully sold, but it can be easily adapted to this version.
Analysis
As previously mentioned, an (ǫ-)SR equilibrium may not exist at all. In such cases, our algorithm will never terminate, increasing the prices unlimitedly. We give the running time in terms of the ratio p SR max /p min . Here, p min = min jpj , the smallest one among the initial prices, and p SR max is an upper bound on the prices in the algorithm; note that we may have p SR max = ∞. In Section 4.3, we give a bound in terms of the maximum and minimum values of the partial derivatives of the utility function. Proof. The invariants (c) and (d) follow similarly as in the proof of Lemma 3.3. We only present the proofs of (a) and (b) that have to be slightly modified.
(a) For each case it is clear that every good is being sold at either p j or (1 + ǫ)p j . Using the invariant (b) it is also clear that exactly a j of good j is sold. Moreover, at the end of the step if we have a good with l j = 0 we increase its price at line (18) and set l j = a j . Hence l j > 0 is also satisfied.
(b) We need to show that exactly a j = max{1, t j /p j } of good j is sold at any point. Suppose that the invariant holds at the beginning of a step. After the for loop, the invariant is still satisfied since the outbid only changes the owner of the good. The invariant could be violated only at line (18) when we increase the price at the end of the step. Trivially, if the price increases to p j and it holds p j ≤ t j the invariant remains valid. So, we only need to deal with case when the price of good j increases to p j and p j > t j . Then, in the new line we added between (18) and (19), we will immediately take away some of good j from the agents to make the invariant valid again.
The bound on the number of rounds within an iteration is exactly the same as for Algorithm 1, while the proof differs slightly due to using Assumption 3 instead of Assumption 2. 
using (4). The money spent by the agent at the beginning of the step is
. Therefore, using ǫ < 0.25, we obtain ∆ϕ ≥p
Proof of Theorem 4.2. The running times follows similarly as in the proof of Theorem 3.1 so we need to to show that the prices p and bundles c (i) form a 4ǫ-approximate market equilibrium. The first two properties in the definition are clear: c (i) is dominated by an optimal bundle x (i) with respect to the prices p (i) , and exactly a j = min{1, t j /p j } of each good j is sold. At termination, the total relative surplus of the agents is bounded by 3ǫ i b i . Moreover,
Conditions on the existence of SR-equilibria
We now present a general bound on the value of p SR max . Suppose that the demand system of each agent i is provided in terms of a monotone concave and differentiable utility function u i in the form (1) . We now assume that each u i is differentiable. The arguments here can be easily adopted for the non-differentiable case by using subgradients. We let
(5) Note that if ∂ j u i (0) = 0, then agent i is not interested in good j at all. In case ∂ j u i (0) > 0 we say that agent i is interested in good j. Note that D is an upper bound on the maximum amount any agent can buy from any good during the algorithm.
We note that t max = ∞ could be possible. However, we can truncate the value of every t j to min{t j , i b i } without changing the problem, since the total spending is at most the total budget price of a good can never rise above this value in the algorithm or in an SR-equilibrium. Thus, we may assume t max ≤ i b i in the bounds below.
A necessary condition on the existence of SR-equilibria The condition i b i ≤ j t j is necessary on the existence of an SR-equilibrium, since j t j is the total amount of money that can be spent on the goods. One can formulate an extension of this, that amounts to Hall's condition in a certain graph. Let (B ∪ G, E) denote the bipartite graph where the two classes B and G represent the agents and goods, respectively. We add an edge (i, j) ∈ E if ∂ j u i (0) > 0, that is, if agent i is interested in good j. For a subset S ⊆ B, we let Γ(S) ⊆ G denote the set of neighbors in this graph. Then, Hall's condition, that is,
is a necessary condition on the existence of an SR-equilibrium. Note however that this condition is not sufficient: it holds for the example of Cobb-Douglas utilities described after Definition 2.8.
Upper bounds on the prices We now give a bound on p SR max in terms of v max , v min , and t max . We first consider the case when every agent is interested in every good. In this case, (6) reduces to the case when S contains all goods. Note that the bounds are finite only if v min > 0, and v max is finite. Note that for the Cobb-Douglas utilities, v max = ∞.
Lemma 4.6. Assume the demand system of every agent is given by the system (1) for monotone concave and differentiable utility functions u i .
(i) Suppose that every agent is interested in every good, that is, ∂ j u i (0) > 0 for every agent i and every good j. Assume that i b i ≤ j t j . Then, the prices throughout the auction algorithm remain bounded by
(ii) Assume condition (6) holds with strict inequality for all S ⊆ B. Then, the prices throughout the auction algorithm remain bounded by (1 + ǫ) n t max
The same bounds are valid for any ǫ-SR equilibrium.
Proof. Let us first consider (i). Let p denote the market prices at a certain point of the algorithm, or at an ǫ-SR equilibrium, and let p SR min be the minimal price among those. Observe that this might be different from p min , since p min is the minimal price at the initialization. Let ℓ be the good with p ℓ = p SR min .
We use the KKT conditions of the convex program (1). We let β (i) denote the Lagrange multiplier of the budget constraint for agent i. Then,
j for all goods j; and equality holds whenever x (i) j > 0. Recall that each good j is owned by some agent during the algorithm as well as in an ǫ-SR-equilibrium.
Consider a good j, and let k be an agent buying j, i.e., c (k) ). The assumption that every agent is interested in every good means that
The proof is complete by showing that p SR min ≤ (1 + ǫ)t max . To prove this, we first show that once p ≥ t, the algorithm terminates. Indeed, if p ≥ t, then the agents spend j t j in total, since the amount a j = min{1, t j /p j } is always fully sold. The condition i b i ≤ j t j shows that buyers cannot have any surplus at this point. Thus, once the lowest price rises above t max , the algorithm terminates. Since the prices increase in steps of (1 + ǫ), we get that p SR min ≤ (1 + ǫ)t max .
Let us now consider part (ii). We take the bipartite graph (B ∪ G, E), and on the same set of nodes we define a directed graph as follows. We orient all edges in E from B to G, and also add the arc (j, i) whenever x (i) j > 0. Fix any good j, and let S be the set of agents in B reachable from j in this directed graph. Note that the set of goods reachable from j will be precisely Γ(S). Let ℓ ∈ Γ(S) be the good with the lowest price p ℓ . As above, we can show that p ℓ ≤ (1 + ǫ)t max , since p ≥ t is not possible. Indeed, once p ≥ t, then all the available amounts of goods in Γ(S) are fully sold, and their total value is j∈Γ(S) t j > i∈S b i by the assumption. By the definition of S, no agent outside S pays for goods in Γ(S), leading to a contradiction.
The directed graph contains a path of length ≤ 2(n−1) from p j to p ℓ . As in the proof of part (i), one can argue that for any two consecutive goods j ′ and j ′′ on this path, p j ′ /p j ′′ ≤ (1+ ǫ)v max /v min . This implies the bound.
Bounding the prices for Gale demand systems Consider now the demand system G u i (p, b i ) defined from a monotone concave utility function by (3) . An important difference is that agent i may not exhaust their full budget b i ; however, the concavity implies that they will never spend more than b i in the optimal bundle. Consequently, even i b i ≤ j t j is not a necessary condition for the existence of an equilibrium.
Still, if we make the strict version of this assumption, as well as the strict version of (6) for the more general case, we can obtain the same bounds as in Lemma 4.6 on the prices. The proof is identical, noting that the KKT conditions for (3) also imply p
j > 0, and the fact that agent i spends at most b i in their optimal bundle. Lemma 4.7. Assume the demand system of every agent is given by the Gale demand system (3) for monotone concave and differentiable utility functions u i .
(i) Suppose that every agent is interested in every good, that is, ∂ j u i (0) > 0 for every agent i and every good j. Assume that i b i ≤ j t j . Then, the prices throughout the auction algorithm remain bounded by (1 + ǫ) 2 t max vmax v min .
We now show that the subroutine FindNewPrices can be implemented for Gale demand systems via convex programming. As previously noted, this result is also applicable for demand systems given in the form (1) for utility functions that are homogeneous of degree one, for which the optimal solutions to (1) and (3) coincide. Let u : R m + → R + be a monotone concave differentiable function. Let us further assume that u is strictly concave, and therefore we have unique demands: |G u (p, b)| = 1 for all (p, b) ∈ R m + . We show that a stronger version of the subroutine can be implemented, replacing the condition y j > (1 + ǫ)c j by y j > c j in (B). We formulate the problem in a slightly more general form where the vector of higher prices (1 + ǫ)p is replaced by an arbitrary price vector q.
Let p, q, c ∈ R m + and x ∈ G u (p, b) such that p ≤ q and c ≤ x. The goal is to findp and y such that (A') y ≥ c where y ∈ G u (p, b), and (B') p ≤p ≤ q andp j = q j whenever y j > c j .
Let us consider the following convex program. This captures the idea that an agent is allowed to buy a good j at two prices: amount y ′ j at price p j and amount y ′′ j at price q j . Moreover, the amount c j of good j is offered at price p j and for the rest an agent pays the higher price q j . 3
We show that the optimal solution to this program, along with the prices obtained from the KKT conditions satisfy the requirements.
Since all constraints are linear, strong duality holds. Let y * = y ′ + y ′′ be an optimal solution of (7). Then, by the KKT conditions, there exists α ∈ R m + such that for any j ∈ [m],
u(y * ) = q j whenever y ′′ j > 0, and
Let us definep j := α j + p j .
Lemma 5.1. The allocations y * and pricesp satisfy (A') and (B').
Proof. Since all constraints are linear, strong duality holds for (3) as well as for (7) . Let us start with (B'). First note that (ii) implies thatp j = q j whenever y * j > c j . Moreover, from (i), (ii), and (iv) it follows thatp j ≤ q j . 3 Trivially, if pj < qj and y ′ < cj then y ′′ j = 0 in any optimal solution. For the goods where pj = qj we assume that y ′ j < cj implies y ′′ j = 0, i.e., we always give priority to y For (A'), let us start by showing y * ∈ G u (p, b). By the KKT conditions this is equivalent to that b∂ j u(y * ) u(y * ) ≤p j and equality holds whenever y * j > 0. This is immediate from (i), (ii), and the definition ofp j .
It remains to show that y * ≥ c. We prove by contradiction: assume that y * j < c j for a good j. This implies y ′′ j = 0 and α j = 0 by the optimality conditions, yieldingp j = p j . By the strict concavity assumption, y * is the unique optimal bundle in G u (p, b). Using the WGS property for (p, b) and (p, b) we have y * j ≥ x j since p j =p j . We obtain a contradiction to y * j < c j ≤ x j .
Budget additive separable piecewise linear concave valuations
We now consider the Gale demand system for budget-additive SPLC, the common generalization of the models in [2] and [31] . We first show that the corresponding demand system is WGS, and give an implementation of the FindNewPrices subroutine for this demand system. Note that the convex programming approach does not immediately apply, since the utility function is not differentiable, and the optimal bundle is not unique. Instead, we give a simple price increment procedure, an extension of that in Lemma 3.7 for linear utilities. The budget-additive SPLC utilities are defined as follows. For every good j, we have k j segments with decreasing utility rates u j1 > u j2 > . . . > u jk j > 0. There are d jt units available at segment t ∈ [k j ]. For example, if we have 2.5 units of good 1, and all segments have length 1, then the utility will be u 11 + u 12 + 0.5u 13 . Further, utility is capped at the value U : our utility is the minimum of U and the sum of the utilities additively accumulated from the goods. Such utilities were studied in [12] for the indivisible setting. We note that in our algorithm, the length of a segment can be any integer, while [2] and [12] use the segments of length 1. Therefore, in case when multiple segments of some good have the same utility our algorithm has a better running time guarantee (the utility function is specified by the utility rate and the length of a segment rather than several segments of length one with the same utility).
The Gale demand system G u (p, b) is defined as the set of optimal solutions to the following formulation.
It can be easily verified, using the KKT conditions given below, that admissible spendings in [2] corresponds to the case when U = ∞, and modest and thrifty demand bundles in [31] to the case when k j = 1 for all j with d j1 = ∞.
Let us now present the KKT conditions characterizing the optimal solution x * . Let r jt be the Lagrange multipliers of the constraint x jt ≤ d jt and γ the Lagrange multiplier of the utility constraint. Recall that u(x * ) = j t u jt x * jt . We have the following:
bu jt u(x * ) = r jt + p j + u jt γ whenever x * jt > 0, (iii) x * jt = d jt whenever r jt > 0, and
Lemma 6.1. The Gale demand system for budget-additive SPLC utilities satisfies the WGS property.
Proof. By (ii), x * jt > 0 implies
, then x * jt = d jt . Let us consider prices p ′ are defined as p ′ j = p j for j ∈ [m] \ {ℓ} and p ′ ℓ > p ℓ . We show that there is a new optimal bundle x ′ at prices p ′ such that x ′ jt ≥ x jt for all j = ℓ and all t ∈ [k j ]. Let u = be the utility obtained at the optimum of (8) and let γ ′ be the Lagrange multiplier of the utility cap constraint under prices p ′ .
Ifū ≤ u(x * i ) then by (iv), γ ′ = 0. Consequently, we have
for all x * jt > 0 and j = ℓ. As noted above, this condition implies x ′ jt = d jt , using also that γ ′ = 0. Hence, for every j = ℓ, every segment of the good that the agent was buying before is now fully bought.
If u = u(x * i ). Then, in order to conclude, it suffices to prove that the optimal solutions of the following convex program satisfy the WGS property.
It is easy to see that the optimal solutions to this problem can be obtained greedily by ordering the segments in decreasing order of
, and fully purchasing them (i.e. allocating x jt = d jt ) until we reach the utility levelū; the final segment might be purchased partially. There might be multiple optimal solutions since multiple segments may have the same ratios; in this case, we may have multiple partially allocated segments in an optimal solution.
When increasing p ℓ , the segments corresponding to good ℓ are moved further back in the ordering, but the relative order of all other segments remains unchanged. Hence, it is clear that one can find an optimal solution x ′ with x ′ jt ≥ x jt for all j = ℓ and t ∈ [k j ].
Bound on p SR max While the budget-additive SPLC utilities are not strictly monotone nor differentiable, the same bound as in Lemma 4.6 (or Lemma 4.7) can be similarly proved for v max = max 
Implementing FindNewPrices
As in Section 5, we show that the following slightly more general version of FindNewPrices can be implemented. Let p, q, c ∈ R m + and x ∈ G u (p, b) such that p ≤ q and c ≤ x. Findp and y such that (A') y ≥ c where y ∈ G u (p, b), and (B') p ≤p ≤ q andp j = q j whenever y j > c j .
Lemma 6.2. The procedure FindNewPrices can be implemented in polynomial time for Gale demand systems with budget-additive SPLC utilities.
The proof is via an algorithm that is an extension of the one in the proof of Lemma 3.7 for linear utilities.
Proof. We present an algorithm for finding such pricesp and bundle y. The algorithm initializes p = p and y = c. The prices as well as the allocations are non-decreasing throughout the algorithm. Note that u(y) < U at the initialization; otherwise, c = x would follow and we can simply output y = x andp = p. We maintain p ≤p ≤ q throughout. For each j ∈ [m], let t j ∈ [k j ] denote the first segment of a good j that is not completely sold in y, i.e., the minimal t j such that y jt j < r jt j . We call this the active segment for j.
Consider the optimal bundle x such that c ≤ x, and let γ be the Lagrange multiplier for the utility cap constraint for x. We initialize β = (b/u(x) − γ) −1 . Then, from (i)-(iii) we see that if x jt = 0 then u jt /p j ≤ β, if 0 < x jt < d jt then u jt /p j = β, and if x jt = d jt then u jt /p j ≥ β.
Stage I: enforcing the complementary conditions The algorithm proceeds in two stages. In the first stage, we consider the goods for which u jt j /p j > β yet y jt j < d jt . (Recall that we initialized y = c andp = p.) For each such good, we increasep j until either u jt j /p j = β, orp j = q j . In the latter case, we buy the entire active segment of j, that is, we increase to y jt j = d jt j . Thus, t j increases by 1. If we still have u jt j /q j > β, we again buy the entire active segment, and continue until u jt j /q j ≤ β for the current active segment. This finishes the description of the first stage.
From the optimality conditions on x, it is easy to see that y ≤ x at the end of the first stage. We claim that the following conditions are satisfied at this point:
y jt > c jt ⇒p j = q j
The conditions (10) and (12) are immediate from the algorithm. The bound (11) follows since y ≤ x; u(y) ≤ u(x) ≤ U by the feasibility of x and u(x) ≤ bβ by the definition of β.
Stage II: price increases In the second stage we continue increasing y andp, as well as decreasing β so that (10), (11) , and (12) are maintained. The algorithm terminates once (11) holds at equality. In this case, one can verify from the optimality conditions that y ∈ G u (p, b). Together with (12), we see that the output satisfies (A') and (B').
The algorithm performs the following iterations. We let A denote the set of goods for which u jt j /p j = β. If there is a good j ∈ A withp j = q j , then we start increasing y jt j until either 1. y jt j = d jt j . Note that t j increases by one in this case, and j leaves A.
2. The inequality (11) becomes binding. In this case, the algorithm terminates.
We now turn to the case whenp j < q j for all j ∈ A. During the iteration we multiplicatively increase the price of every good in A by the same factor α > 0, as well as decrease β by the factor α. We choose the smallest value of α when one of the following events happen:
1. For some j ∈ A we reachp j = q j . We change the allocations as described above.
2. The inequality (11) becomes binding (due to the decrease in β). In this case, the algorithm terminates.
3. For some good ℓ / ∈ A, u ℓt ℓ p ℓ = β. In this case, we add ℓ to A, and iterate with the larger set.
It is easy to see that all three properties (10), (11) , and (12) are maintained throughout the algorithm. We claim that the number of price change steps is at most j k j . Indeed, a price increase step always ends when a good j withp j = q j enters A, either in case 1 or case 3. Once this happens, we increase y jt j ; if the algorithm does not terminate, then we saturate the segment to y jt j = d j . This shows that the number of price augmentation steps is bounded by the total number of segments.
A Appendix: Missing proofs Lemma 2.6. The CES demand system with parameter σ > 1 has elasticity at least −σ, and the Cobb-Douglas demand system has elasticity at least −1.
Proof. Using the form of CES utilities described above, the demand at prices p is x j = β j p
Fix a good j. Denote with x ′ the optimal bundle where we increase the price of good j by factor (1 + µ). Since CES satisfies the WGS property for σ > 1, we have
For Cobb-Douglas utility function is given by u(x) = j x α j j where j α j = 1, α ≥ 0, the optimal bundle is x j = bα j p j . Hence, increasing the price of a good by some factor leads to the decrease in demand for that good by the same factor.
B Appendix: Exchange markets
B.1 Running times of existing auction algorithms
We review the running time bounds given in previous auction algorithms and compare them to our bounds.
Linear utility functions [34] The paper includes two algorithms. The running time of the first algorithm is O nm ǫ 2 log p max 1 ⊤ e ǫe min log p max , and for the second one it is O nm ǫ (n + m) log p max .
The running time in Theorem 3.1, with the bound T F = O(m) for linear utilities from Lemma 3.7, gives an additional factor (m + n). The first log factor is removed, however, we obtain a weaker equilibrium notion. The additional factor is due to our global update step: due to the more general, nonseparable nature of our framework, we consider all goods when updating an agent, while [34] considers only one good for an update. The paper also gives the price bound p max ≤ (1 + ǫ) vmax v min (assuming the algorithm is initialized with all prices equal to 1) where v max = max i,j v i,j and v min = min i,j v i,j are the highest utility and the lowest utility and agent has for a good, as well as a more general bound for the case when v min = 0 is possible. These bounds are comparable to our bounds in Section 4.3 for SR-equilibria.
